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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
This appeal is properly within the jurisdiction of the
Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2)(j).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
I.

DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF FAILED
TO REBUT THE EMPLOYMENT AT WILL PRESUMPTION?

II.

DID THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONSIDERED THE TESTIMONY OF
THE WITNESSES?

III.

CAN THE COURT OF APPEALS ALTERNATIVELY AFFIRM THE
DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT ON THE GROUND THAT DEFENDANT
MET THE TERMS OF ANY IMPLIED-IN-FACT CONTRACT WITH
PLAINTIFF?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court of Appeals reviews the trial court's findings

of fact underlying an order to dismiss under Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure 41(b) for clear error, according "great weight to the
findings made and the inferences drawn by the trial judge."
Southern Title Guaranty Co. v. Bethers, 761 P.2d 951, 954, (Utah
App. 1988); accord Handy v. Union Pacific R. Co., 841 P.2d 1210,
1215 (Utah App. 1992).
erroneous only

The trial court's findings are clearly

if they are against

the great weight of the

evidence, or if the appellate court reaches a definite and firm
conviction that the trial court has erred. Southern Title Guaranty
Co. , 761 P.2d at 954.

The Court reviews the trial court's

conclusions of law for correctness.

Id.

The existence of an

implied-in-fact contract of employment and adherence thereto is a

factual question.

Sanderson v. First Security Leasing Co., 201

Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 19 (Utah 1992).
Rule 41(b) commits the weighing of the evidence to the
discretion of the trial judge.
credibility

and

weight

The Court of Appeals reviews

determinations

for

an

abuse

of

that

discretion. It is within the exclusive province of the trial court
to decide "whether a witness is believable and [to] determin[e]
what weight to assign a witness's testimony." Lemon v. Coates. 735
P.2d 58, 60 (Utah 1987); see also Wessel v. Erickson Landscaping
Co. , 711 P.2d 250, 252 (Utah 1985) (purpose of Rule 41 is to permit
the judge to weigh the evidence and draw inferences therefrom).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal of the dismissal of plaintiff's case
pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Plaintiff Kelly Sorenson brought suit in the Third District Court
alleging wrongful termination in violation of an implied contract
of employment.

Sorenson contends that he was entitled to, and

subsequently denied, notice of his deficient job performance, and
application of progressive discipline prior to his termination.
The trial court found that Sorenson was an at-will employee and
could be terminated for any reason.

Notwithstanding, Sorenson

received substantial notice of his deficient performance and was
granted significant opportunities to improve his performance and
retain his employment.

2

Sorenson filed his complaint in the Third District Court
on September 18, 19 89.

After a year of discovery, defendant

Kennecott brought a Motion for Summary Judgment.
denied

Kennecott's

Motion

for

Summary

Sorenson's motion to amend his Complaint.

The trial court

Judgment

and

granted

A trial was conducted

before Judge Scott Daniels on January 27 through January 30, 1992.
Sorenson

testified

extensively

in his

own

behalf,

and

also

introduced the testimony of three former Kennecott employees.
Stewart Smith testified by videotape deposition, shown at trial.
After Sorenson concluded the presentation of his case, Kennecott
sought a dismissal under Rule 41(b).

The district court heard

arguments on Kennecott's motion on March 12, 1992, and the court
granted

Kennecott's

motion

and

dismissed

Sorenson's

Amended

Complaint on April 2, 1992.
In granting Kennecott's motion to dismiss, the trial
court found that Kennecott's progressive discipline practices were
required

by

the

Collective

Bargaining

Agreement

for union-

represented employees. In contrast, progressive discipline was not
applied to supervisory employees as a matter of contract.

Rather

it was applied in an informal manner and as a matter of good
management.

The court found that Sorenson failed to demonstrate

the existence of any implied contract between Kennecott and himself
for continued employment, and found that Sorenson, as a supervisory
employee, was not entitled to progressive discipline as a matter of
contract.

3

FACTUAL HISTORY
Kennecott hired Sorenson on March 18, 1974, as an entrylevel metallurgical engineer in the operations group at its smelter
facility.

(T. pp. 50, 59. )1 Sorenson remained in the operations

group until 1987, where he held several titles, the last being that
of material handling general foreman. He held this title from 1984
to 19 87, which included a period during which the smelter was in a
shutdown mode.

(T. pp. 72, 367-368.)

During this period of time

Dallas Mikich, operations superintendent, was Sorenson's direct
supervisor.2

(T. pp. 68, 366.)

In June 1987, after the start-up

of the smelter, Sorenson was transferred from the operations group
to

the

smelter

technical

technical superintendent.

group,

reporting

(T. pp. 370-371.)

to David George,
As part of this

transfer, Sorenson received a two-level grade reduction and was
demoted to metallurgical engineer, a title he retained until his
transfer to the Bonneville concentrator facility in July 1988. (T.
pp. 369, 373.)

David George remained his supervisor during this

entire time from July 1987 through July 1988.

As a member of the

technical group, Sorenson provided technical support for the startup of the smelter.

(T. p. 370.)

In that capacity Sorenson was

1

References to the trial transcript are abbreviated "T."
followed by the appropriate page number.
References to the
deposition of Stewart Smith, video taped and presented at trial,
are indicated as "(Stewart depo. p.
.) " References to the Kelly
Sorenson deposition, published at trial, are abbreviated "(Sorenson
depo. p.
. ) " Trial exhibits are abbreviated "Ex.
."
2

There were four groups at the smelter:
operations,
maintenance, technical, and by-products, each with their own
superintendent who in turn reported to the smelter manager.
(T. p. 370).
4

assigned in July 19 87 to provide support to the anode plant, where
he remained until November 1987, when he was given the assignment
of coordinating the start-up of the filter plant.

(T. pp. 77, 373,

375, 377, 380.) Sorenson remained in the filter plant until he was
transferred to the Bonneville concentrator in July 1988. Sorenson
worked at the Bonneville concentrator until his employment was
terminated on January 31, 1989.

(T. p. 50.)

In attempting to establish an implied-in-fact contract of
employment

between

Kennecott

and

himself,

Sorenson

relied

principally upon a 1973 edition of the general code of conduct
which he signed 1974 when he accepted employment with Kennecott.
Sorenson particularly

relies on the

fourth paragraph

of the

foreword to the 1973 edition of the general rules of conduct, which
states:
Violation of these rules is cause for either
(1) written warning, or (2) suspension subject
to hearing for discipline purposes. Such a
hearing can result in penalty, lay-off or
discharge, depending upon the seriousness of
the offense.
(T. pp. 387-88; Ex. 1.)

Sorenson also cites oral representations

made to him by Charlie Bird and Gene Bryant at the time he was
hired.

(T. pp. 54, 57.)

Bird and Bryant each merely reiterated

the provisions of the rules of conduct.

(T. pp. 54, 57-58.) These

rules of conduct were in effect until April 4, 1974, when they were
succeeded by a replacement code of conduct.
154.)

(T. pp. 383-84; Ex.

The 1974 code did not contain any language similar to the

paragraph relied upon by Sorenson, and explicitly stated that it
superseded all prior codes of conduct and disciplinary rules. The
5

1974 code was, in turn, replaced by a new set of general rules of
conduct issued in 1977.

(T. p. 384; Ex. 155.)

Those rules were

once again superseded by rules issued in 1980.

(T. p. 385; Ex.

156.)

Successor general codes of conduct were issued in 1984 and

1986.

(T. pp. 385-87; Ex. 157, 158.)

Without exception, each of

these subsequent documents expressly stated that it superseded and
replaced any and all previously issued rules of conduct.
389.)

(T. p.

Also without exception, none of these documents contained

any language similar to that relied upon by Sorenson in the 19 73
General Rules of Conduct, now five times succeeded, in effect at
the time Sorenson accepted employment at Kennecott.

(T. p. 388.)

Sorenson also places great weight on the course content
of several management training seminars which he attended during
his tenure at Kennecott.

Sorenson's first management training

seminar was held approximately six weeks after he began employment
with Kennecott in 1974.
presented

as

(T. p. 113.)

including

verbal

Progressive discipline was

warnings,

written

warnings,

suspension, and hearings as precedents to termination.
119.)

(T. p.

The seminar included detailed discussions of dovetailing

progressive
Bargaining
Sorenson

discipline with the provisions of
Agreement

testified

presentation

for hourly
that

distinctively

none

workers.

of

excluded

the

the Collective

(T. pp.

facilitators

salaried

114-15.)
of

this

(or supervisory)

employees from their discussions of corrective or progressive
discipline.
formed

a

(T. p. 115.) From this absence of exclusion, Sorenson
subjective

belief

that
6

all

of

the

provisions

of

progressive discipline applied to him,

(T. pp. 120, 122-23.)

Later in the same year Sorenson attended another seminar where
progressive discipline was "briefly touched on" and the discussions
"did not contradict" Sorenson's subjective understanding of the
application of progressive discipline.

(T. p. 116.)

Again,

Sorenson relies on the fact that no one issued a disclaimer that
the discussions of the mechanics of progressive discipline applied
only to union employees and not to salaried employees.

(T.

p. 117.)
Sorenson next attended two management training sessions
in the early 1980s, one at which corrective discipline principles
were illustrated through a pre-packaged video tape presentation
that Kennecott had purchased (Zenger-Miller course).
Sorenson

recalled

that

depicted

supervisors

one of

addressing

(T. p. 121.)

the Zenger-Miller video tapes
both

supervisors

and

hourly

employees concerning the correction of behavioral problems but
provided no detail as to the content of those tapes.

(T. p. 122.)

Sorenson also testified he also attended a management training
seminar sometime in 1983 or 1984 which was almost identical in
content to the initial training program he attended in the early
1980's.

(T. pp. 123, 125.)

none

the

of

instructors

Once again, Sorenson testified that

specifically

articulated

that

their

comments were strictly limited to employees covered under the
Collective Bargaining Agreement.

(T. p. 125.)

In the last training program he attended, Sorenson was a
facilitator. This program was known as the Fresh Start program, a
7

program for Kennecott employees returning to work in 1986 after the
shutdown of Kennecott Utah Copper.
Kennecott's "fresh start".
at

that program

progression

of

said

It emphasized team spirit and

(T. pp. 128-30, 513; Ex. 143.)

salaried

discipline

employees

which

included

were

entitled

verbal

warnings, and suspension prior to termination.

No one

and

to a

written

(T. pp. 396-97.)

Sorenson also relies on a manual distributed in connection with a
19 88 management seminar which he did not attend, despite the fact
that his initial testimony detailed his attendance at that seminar.
(Sorenson depo. pp. 32-39; T. pp. 398-411).
Sorenson also relies upon the discipline of approximately
twelve supervisors during his fifteen year tenure at Kennecott to
support his belief that he was subject to progressive discipline
requirements

(Sorenson had personal knowledge of only seven).

Sorenson contends that various elements of progressive discipline
were applied to these twelve supervisors, and therefore established
a course of conduct requiring Kennecott to apply progressive
discipline

to him.

Notwithstanding, Sorenson

testified that

disciplinary measures for supervisors had to be dealt with in "new
creative ways."

Sorenson stated that with one supervisor, they

"hit upon an idea" for discipline, implying that the various
training seminars did not address the discipline of supervisory
employees.
Sorenson's performance resulted in a two-grade demotion
in June of 1987.

(T. p. 3 69.) Sorenson's performance continued to

be questionable during 1987.

For example, after being dispatched
8

to Chile in December to acquire information to assist Kennecott in
troubleshooting its Utah operations, Sorenson failed to report his
evaluation to his supervisor, David George, until ten days after
his return.

(T. pp. 90, 94.)

This failure to timely report

prompted David George, Sorenson7s supervisor, to write a letter to
Sorenson detailing his performance deficiencies.

(T. p. 449.) In

his 19 87 annual performance review, which he received in February
1988, Sorenson received a G- (below average) performance rating,
reflecting his substandard job performance.

(T. p. 448.) Although

both Sorenson and Jerry Hansen,3 on Sorenson7s behalf, challenged
this rating, Stewart Smith, the smelter plant manager, would not
agree to alter the rating.

(T. p. 576.)

Sorenson7s deficiencies.

about

Smith also testified

He testified

that Sorenson7s

coordination of the start-up of the anode casting plant did not go
"particularly well."
execute

(Smith depo. p. 17.)

"numerous plans

improperly.

Sorenson failed to

of action" or executed

(Smith depo. pp. 18-19.)

action plans

Smith discussed Sorenson7s

management deficiencies with him and ultimately directed that
Sorenson

be

performance."

removed

from

the

anode

plant

for

"inadequate

(Smith depo. pp. 19, 21.)

3

Jerry Hansen was the operations superintendent. Both George
and Hansen reported to Stewart Smith, smelter manager. (T. p. 370;
Smith depo. pp. 15, 20.) Jerry Hansen was maintenance superintendent from 1977 to January 1, 1987 (T. p. 86) ; acting plant
manager from January 1, 1987 to June 19 87, the period immediately
preceding the smelter start-up; operations superintendent from July
1987 to August 19 88; and manager of engineer projects from August
1988 to September 1989 when he left Kennecott. (T. p. 485-486.)
Hansen became the operations superintendent at the same time
Sorenson was transferred from the operations group to the technical
group.
9

Smith testified that he would not have continued to
employ Sorenson at the smelter because Sorenson had had "ample
opportunity to mend his ways."
Sorenson7s

performance

(Smith depo. p. 23.)

failures, Kennecott

gave

Sorenson

opportunity to transfer to the Bonneville concentrator.
depo. p. 22.)

Despite
the

(Smith

When Sorenson failed to report to work at the

Bonneville concentrator as scheduled, Smith called Sorenson into
his office and advised him "this may be [your] last chance and
[you] should get over there [to the concentrator] post-haste."
(Smith depo. p. 22.)

Smith continued, telling Sorenson that "this

is an opportunity where you can redeem yourself. I suggest you get
over there and give it your best shot."

(Smith depo. p. 28.)

Sorenson transferred to the Bonneville concentrator in
July 19 88 as the operations general foreman.

Senior managers Rod

Davey and Bill Strickland toured the concentrator plant in December
1988.

(T. pp.

displeased

with

298-307.)
the

Sorenson

condition

of

conceded

they

the plant.

appeared

(T. p. 307.)

Subsequently, Gary Jungenburg, Sorenson's immediate supervisor,
told Sorenson that Davey and Strickland were not happy with the
condition of the concentrator and wanted a cleanup schedule.
pp. 316-17.)

(T.

Sorenson expressed his recognition of these problems

in memoranda to Gary Jungenburg detailing cleanup schedules for
equipment in the secondary crushing area.

(T. pp. 319-20; Ex. 17.)

Sorenson and Jungenburg had ongoing conversations during this
period concerning the condition of the Bonneville concentrator and
the necessity for immediate action.
10

(T. p. 326.)

In January,

Sorenson

had

a

similar

conversation

with

Chris

Jungenburg's successor and Sorenson's new supervisor.

Robison,

(T. pp. 325-

29.) Shortly before his termination Robison told Sorenson that the
condition of the Bonneville concentrator was likely to cause "some
people

[to] lose

their

reference to Sorenson.

jobs,"

although

there was no direct

(T. p. 330.)

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Kennecott did not hire Sorenson for any definite period
of time and he is therefore presumed to be an at-will employee.
Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033, 1040 (Utah 1989).
The trial court properly found that Sorenson did not rebut the
presumption of at-will employment because Sorenson could not meet
the standard articulated in Johnson v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., 818
P.2d 997 (Utah 1991) . Under Johnson, an employee must show that he
reasonably believed his at-will status was altered by a sufficiently definite communication that the employer intended to create
an employment relationship other than employment at-will. Johnson,
818 P.2d at 1002.

Sorenson relied on the preface of an out-dated

and superseded code of conduct, as well as subsequent communications in management training classes and Kennecott's course of
conduct, in his attempt to show that he had an implied-in-fact
contract for continued employment. None of these factors factually
supported an implied contract.
The trial court implicitly discounted witness testimony
concerning

Sorenson7s

contractual
11

entitlement

to

progressive

discipline. Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows
the trial judge to determine witness credibility and to assess the
proper weight to assign to testimony.
demonstrably

Sorenson's credibility was

diminished by self-conflicting

testimony.

Jerry

Hansen, Sorenson's secondary witness, testified about progressive
discipline

in vague terms, and had little actual

supervisory

responsibility over Sorenson. Finally, both witnesses were sharply
contradicted by Stewart Smith, a witness fired by Kennecott.
Even if the Court holds that the trial court's factual
finding that there was no implied contract is clearly erroneous,
the Court should alternatively affirm the trial court's judgment on
the grounds that Kennecott provided Sorenson notice prior to
termination. Sorenson received a series of communications, such as
a performance evaluation, letter from his supervisor, and memoranda
regarding his area of responsibility.

In addition, Sorenson's

supervisors counseled with him and advised him to improve his
performance.

Sorenson was not entitled to a rigid succession of

disciplinary measures. He received adequate notice that Kennecott
viewed

his

performance

as

unsatisfactory,

unacceptable.

12

and

ultimately

ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF
FAILED TO SUCCESSFULLY REBUT THE PRESUMPTION OF
EMPLOYMENT AT WILL.
A.

Because Sorenson was Hired for an
Indefinite Period of Time# His
Employment was Terminable at Will.

When an employee is hired for an indefinite period of
time,

the

law presumes

that

the

employment

relationship

is

terminable at-will, i.e., that it may be terminated by either the
employee or the employer at any time and for any reason. Berube,
771 P.2d at 1040-41, 1044.

Sorenson had no employment contract

with Kennecott for a definite period of time such as one or two or
twenty years; he was employed for an indefinite period.
359.)

(T. p.

Accordingly, a presumption arises that his employment was

terminable

at-will by himself

or by Kennecott.

Brehany v.

Nordstrom, Inc.. 812 P.2d 49, 55 (Utah 1991); Berube, 771 P.2d at
1044.

The trial court ruled that Sorenson's implied contract claim

failed because he could not overcome this presumption that his
employment was terminable at-will.
The trial court found that Kennecott's disciplinary
practices with salaried employees were "never part of a contract."
Sorenson v. Kennecott Utah Copper Corp., Order and Judgment of
Dismissal, No. 89-0905608 at 2 (3rd Dist. Ct., Apr. 2, 1992).

The

presumption

"an

of at-will

employment may be overcome where

employer's internally adopted policies and procedures concerning
discharge . . . purport to establish limitations on the employer's
right to discharge."

Caldwell v. Ford Bacon & Davis Utah, Inc.,
13

777 P.2d 483, 485 (Utah 1989); Brehany, 812 P.2d at 55. An implied
employment contract, whether based on a written document, such as
the 1973 General Rules of Conduct, or the employer's course of
conduct

with

its

employees, may

establish

implied

terms of

employment only if the policy statement or custom relied on clearly
indicates that the employer has relinquished its "unfettered right
to discharge its employees."

Brehany. 812 P.2d at 54-56.

In Johnson v. Morton Thiokol. Inc., the Utah Supreme
Court

held

that

in

determining

whether

an

employer

has

contractually limited its right to terminate at will the intent of
the

employer

is

controlling.

Johnson,

818

P.2d

at

1002.

Therefore, for there to be an implied employment contract that
overcomes the presumption of at-will employment, the plaintiff must
establish that the employer "intended to modify the employment
relationship to provide that an employee could be terminated only
for good cause."

Johnson, 818 P.2d at 1003.

The Johnson court articulated the employee's burden as
showing that the employer manifested its intent to contract on
other than at-will basis.
[F]or an implied-in-fact contract to exist, it
must meet the requirements for an offer of a
unilateral contract.
There must be a
manifestation of the employer's intent that is
communicated to the employee and sufficiently
definite to operate as a contract provision.
Furthermore,
the
manifestation
of
the
employer's intent must be of such a nature
that the employee can reasonably believe that
the employer is making an offer of employment
other than employment at-will.
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Johnson, 818 P.2d at 1002 (citations omitted).

Thus, no contract

is formed if the employer communicates its intention in such a way
that an employee could not reasonably believe that his or her
employment is other than at-will.
The Johnson court also emphasized that an employer is
free to change or abolish the terms of the unilateral contract by
offering superseding or different terms. "The unilateral nature of
such an employment contract is important because it affects the
flexibility of the employment relationship."

Johnson, 818 P.2d at

1002.
In the case of a unilateral contract for
employment, where an at-will employee retains
employment with knowledge of new or changed
conditions, the new or changed conditions may
become contractual obligations.
In this
manner, an original employment contract may be
modified
or
replaced
by
a
subsequent
unilateral contract. The employee's retention
of employment constitutes acceptance of the
offer of a unilateral contract; by continuing
to stay on the job although free to leave, the
employment
supplies
the
necessary
consideration for the offer.
Id. (quoting Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 627
(Minn. 1983)).
continued

See also Brehany, 812 P.2d at 56 n.2

rendering

of

services

by

an

employee

("the

is

consideration that supports the binding effect of the terms. The
employer may, however, change those terms or even abolish them").
B.

The Trial Court Properly Found That
Kennecott's Code of Conduct Did Not
Support an Implied-in-fact Contract
for Continued Employment.

The trial court found that the 1973 General Rules of
Conduct did not support an implied-in-fact employment contract.

Even though the General Rules of Conduct were superseded by five
subsequent documents, Sorenson relies exclusively on a single
paragraph in the preface, which paragraph finds no home in any of
the subsequent documents.

Sorenson ignores the fact that each of

the subsequent codes of conduct contain explicit and unequivocal
declarations that all prior codes were superseded.

Thus, under

Johnson, the language relied upon by Sorenson is of no effect.
Applying the unilateral contract principles articulated in Johnson,
a number of courts have held, as a matter of law, that an
employer's new employment terms offered to an employee supersede
prior unilateral contract terms.

For example, in Bedow v. Valley

National Bank, 5 I.E.R. Cases 1678 (D. Ariz. 1988), the court held
that a personnel manual containing an at-will disclaimer, which was
in effect at the time of plaintiff's termination, was controlling.
The court stated:
Any other conclusion would create chaos for
employers who would have different contracts
for different employees depending upon the
particular personnel manual in force when the
employee was hired.
Id. at 1680. See also Ferrer v. Nielsen, 799 P.2d 458, 460 (Colo.
App. 1990) (summary judgment affirmed where court applied 1986
provisions

rather

than

1982 provisions

to

defeat

discharged

employee's implied contract claims); Castialione v. Johns Hopkins
Hospital, 517 A.2d 786, 790, n.4 (Md. App. 1986) (by continuing to
work

for

hospital

after

new manual

distribution,

discharged

employee, by her conduct, impliedly assented to modification of
employment agreement).

The trial court properly discounted the
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1973 General Rules of Conduct as supporting an implied-in-fact
contract

for employment

because

the

Rules

were

subsequently

superseded.
In sum, Johnson stands for the proposition that an
implied employment contract, if indeed one exists, is a unilateral
contract that an employer may alter or terminate by providing new
terms or conditions.

Therefore, under Johnson, the trial court

properly dismissed plaintiff's

implied

contract

claim on the

grounds that the 1973 General Rules of Conduct did not give rise to
an implied contract term.
C*

The Trial Court Properly Found that
Kennecott's Course of Conduct in
Practicing Progressive Discipline
was Not a Part of Any Contract.

The Utah Supreme Court has never held that an employer's
course of conduct or oral statements, standing alone, creates an
implied-in-fact contract for continued employment,

Hodgson v.

Bunzl Utah, Inc., 202 Utah Adv. Rep. 22, 23 (Utah 1992) . However,
the respective conduct of an employer and employee may constitute
evidence of an employer's intent to alter the at-will employment
relationship. Gilmore v. Salt Lake Area Community Action Program,
775 P.2d 940, 942 (Utah App. 1989) . The supreme court has recently
held that "in order for an employer's conduct to create an impliedin-fact contract modifying at-will employment, the conduct must
meet the standards of a unilateral offer and acceptance." Hodgson,
202 Utah Adv. Rep. at 24 (citing Johnson, 818 P.2d at 1002).
Sorenson testified that his opinion regarding Kennecott's
course

of

conduct

was

developed
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from

his

familiarity

with

circumstances

involving

seven

non-union

employees

who

were

subjected to some form or facet of progressive discipline, during
his fifteen year tenure.

(T. p. 151.)

Jerry Hansen and Tracy

Johnson also related their knowledge of five other disciplinary
situations involving supervisors.

(T. pp. 551-59, 640-41, 646-47.)

While Sorenson testified that several of those employees received
verbal and/or written warnings, Sorenson was able to identify only
one employee who had received a disciplinary hearing and only one
instance when suspension was used in the course of progressive
discipline.

(T. p. 564.) With respect to this instance, Sorenson

testified that two discussions among the smelter plant manager and
various foremen preceded the decision to suspend this particular
employee.

(T. p. 430.)

The group struggled with the appropriate

course of action in an attempt to "determine our next step, " and to
find a solution "short of termination."

(T. pp. 429-3 0.)

They

were "looking for a creative way to handle the problem, " and
expressed

concern

that

if

suspension

was

used

without

a

corresponding pay reduction that suspension for salaried employees
would be viewed as a desired break rather than a punitive or
corrective action.
aware

of

suspended.

any

(T. pp. 431-32.)

instance

in which

a

No one in attendance was
supervisor

had

ever been

(T. p. 436.) Significantly, these discussions occurred

after most of the training sessions Sorenson relies on to establish
that progressive discipline -- consisting of a progression from
verbal to written warnings, then to suspension -- was clearly
applicable

to supervisory

personnel.
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See section D, below.

Stewart Smith testified that suspension was definitely not part of
a defined supervisory disciplinary scheme during his tenure with
Kennecott.

(Smith depo. p. 46.)

And, in fifteen years, acting in

his supervisory capacity, Sorenson never utilized rigid steps of
progressive discipline for those employees under his supervision.
(T. pp. 438-39.)

Although on occasion he counseled supervisors

about performance problems, he never issued any written performance
notices to any of his salaried employees nor suspended anyone. (T.
p. 438.)
Significantly, each of the witnesses Sorenson relies on,
as well as Sorenson himself, were either terminated by Kennecott or
received a demotion. Sorenson testified that he was given a double
grade demotion in 1987, but there is no testimony that the demotion
was preceded by any form of notice or discipline. Jerry Hansen, a
critical witness for Sorenson's course of conduct theory, was
demoted from a high level management position and assigned as an
engineer.

(Smith depo. p. 27.)

Yet Hansen did not claim to have

received notice prior to removal.

Tracy Johnson, another of

Sorenson's witnesses, had been reassigned because of performance
deficiencies and was ultimately terminated from employment without
prior notice or discipline.

(T. pp. 644, 649-50.)

Finally,

Stewart Smith, Sorenson's last witness, was similarly fired by
Kennecott, without a stated reason and without prior notice.
(Smith depo. p. 44.)

Smith, having been fired, testified that

there was no company policy regarding discipline of supervisors.
(Smith depo. at 46.)
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Sorenson attempted to show the trial court a pattern of
progressive discipline based upon his knowledge of seven isolated
and distinct incidents, spread over the course of fifteen years,
and handled distinctively as the circumstances required.

In

Hodgson, the plaintiff argued that the employer's course of conduct
in disciplining other employees created an expectation that she
would receive disciplinary warnings prior to termination. Hodgson,
202 Utah Adv. Rep. at 24. The plaintiff produced evidence of four
episodes of employee discipline in two years, resulting in two
written warnings and two oral warnings as well as the imposition of
probationary periods. The probationary periods varied from ninety
days to an unspecified period, and no written policy dictated the
length of probation for any specific offense. The court held that
this pattern of employee discipline did not meet the standard for
creating

an

implied-in-fact

employment relationship.
sanctions meted

out

contract

modifying

the

at-will

The court stated that the disciplinary

to the employees were not

"sufficiently

definite to constitute a contract term because they were too
inconsistent."

Hodgson, 202 Utah Adv. Rep. at 24.

Sorenson's testimony of his view of Kennecott's course of
conduct is not unlike the situation before the court in Hodgson.
Indeed,

Sorenson's

own

testimony

demonstrated

that

Kennecott

managers were uncertain as to how to proceed with a salaried
employee who might require discipline.

Sorenson, Hansen, Johnson

and Stewart had first hand experience with Kennecott's course of
conduct, and knew that demotions or other actions might come
20

without prior communication from Kennecott.

It is this same

uncertainty that mandates the result reached by the trial court.
Under

the

standard

of Johnson v. Morton Thiokol.

Inc., the

employer's conduct must be sufficiently definite and consistent to
act

as

a

contract

provision.

Johnson,

818

P. 2d

at 1002.

Kennecott's individual attention and reaction to the performance
difficulties of a relative few salaried employees over the course
of fifteen years simply did not meet this standard.

Faced with

this weak evidence, and confronted with conflicting evidence of
Kennecott's course of conduct presented by Sorenson himself, the
trial court did not err in finding that Kennecott's course of
conduct does not support an implied-in-fact contract for continued
employment.
D.

Kennecott's
Management
Training
Programs do not Support an Impliedin-fact
Contract
for Continued
Employment.

Neither

Sorenson's

subjective

impressions

following

discussions with his own superiors nor the concepts taught in
Kennecott's management training seminars support a finding that
Kennecott intended to alter the at-will employment status of its
salaried

employees.

Sorenson participated

in six management

training seminars over the course of his fifteen year tenure.
pp. 110-26.)

(T.

It is readily apparent from the content of these

seminars that the seminars were intended to instruct management
personnel on dealing with employees covered by the Collective
Bargaining

Agreement, and

not

to

teach

generally

applicable

principles for the discipline of all Kennecott employees.
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(T. pp.

412-14.)

Consistent treatment of union workers was a repeated

theme throughout the management seminars.

(T. p. 413.)

The

seminars taught tools for implementing the terms of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement.4 For example, Sorenson testified extensively
about a manual distributed at a management training seminar at
Copperton.5

(Ex. 5.)

Prominently placed in the pocket of the

training manual was a complete copy of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement.

(T. p. 412.)

A principal section of the manual was

dedicated to Discipline and Counseling.

(T. p. 413.) That section

contained a disciplinary checklist specifically harmonized with the
Collective Bargaining Agreement and designed with the objective of
providing consistent discipline according to the terms of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement.
discussed

(T. p.413.)

the Justice and Dignity

The manual also

requirement, a

term drawn

directly from the Collective Bargaining Agreement and not appearing
in any document applying to management employees.
Finally,

the

training

manual

discussed

(T. p. 413-14.)

participation

in the

Sorenson argues that his understanding of progressive
discipline as taught during the various seminars was a singular
system applicable to all employees, i.e., there was "no distinction
made that progressive discipline was limited in application to
hourly and union employees."
Appellant's Brief at 10.
This
assertion is inconsistent, however, with his recognition that he
was not entitled to progressive discipline as applicable to hourly
workers. Appellant's Brief at 30-31.
5

Sorenson also testified extensively and in meticulous
detail concerning the content of the seminar, attendance at the
seminar, and discussions held during the seminar. However, he
later recanted the entirety of that testimony and admitted that he
had never actually attended the seminar, although he did receive
and review the manual distributed at the seminar. (Sorenson depo.
pp. 32-39; T. pp. 398-411.)
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grievance procedure.

(T. p. 414.)

Grievance procedures were

applicable solely to union-represented employees; Sorenson conceded
that there was no grievance procedure available to any salaried
employee.

(T. p. 43 8.)
Although Sorenson argues that Kennecott's course of

conduct

supports

his

claim

of

an

implied-in-fact

employment

contract, Sorenson's own post-seminar conduct demonstrates that the
seminar discussions did not address how to handle performance
problems with salaried staff.

After attending several training

seminars at which progressive discipline was discussed, Sorenson
participated in mid-level management discussions revolving around
questions of how to deal with Ray Stireman and Bob Chesley, two
salaried supervisors experiencing performance problems.
419-20.)

(T. pp.

Sorenson described the content of these discussions with

phrases such as "hit upon an idea" and arriving at a "new creative
way to handle" these disciplinary situations.
51-52; T. pp. 431-32.)

(Sorenson depo. pp.

There was no precedent or directive to

guide the discipline of supervisory personnel.

Apparently, the

provisions of progressive discipline which Sorenson claimed to
apply to all employees, including salaried management employees,
were given short shrift in these discussions.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONSIDERED THE TESTIMONY OF THE
WITNESSES.
Sorenson

complains

that

the

trial

court

failed

to

properly consider the testimony regarding progressive discipline as
constituting a term and condition of his employment with Kennecott.
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Essentially, Sorenson complains that the trial court did not give
sufficient weight and credibility to Jerry Hansen's testimony on
this issue.

In ruling on a Rule 41(b) motion for dismissal, the

trial court may make assessments of credibility and determine, in
its discretion, what weight to assign a witness's testimony.
Lemon, 735 P.2d at 60; Wessel, 711 P.2d at 252.

Sorenson must

demonstrate to this Court that the trial court's evaluation of the
evidence was an abuse of discretion.

Several episodes in the

record illustrate that there are flaws in both Sorenson's and
Hansen's credibility, and demonstrate the proper weight to assign
their testimony.
Sorenson banked heavily on Jerry Hansen's testimony to
establish the practice of progressive discipline at Kennecott. On
direct

examination, Hansen testified

at length regarding his

understanding of progressive discipline.
testimony

emphasized

his

teaching

(T. pp. 533-96.)

in a series

of

His

repetitive

management training seminars from 1975 through 1981, and suggested
the content of those seminars provided for the application of a
rigid system of progressive discipline which applied equally to
employees governed by the Collective Bargaining Agreement as well
as

supervisory

personnel.

This

system

required

informal

counseling, verbal and written warnings, suspension and a hearing
before termination.

But the content of the seminars was not

directed to disciplining supervisors but rather was focused on
hourly employees.
rule

For instance, the application of the hot stove

(e.g., anyone who touches the stove will be burned) was
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illustrated by references to actual grievances involving the union
work force.

(T. p. 492)

The seminar materials show the same

emphasis - - foremen applying discipline to hourly employees (T.
p. 493) .

There were no statements, no illustrations, no context

from which it can be established that the seminar was intended to
address the issue of the discipline of supervisors. Further, when
his definition of progressive discipline was probed on cross
examination, Hansen's testimony described a system of progressive
discipline with highly elastic parameters.

(T. pp. 585-95.)

Moreover, the pivotal element of Hansen's testimony was that the
range of protections, such as the stepped grievance process,
arbitration,

reinstatement,

record

expungement,

union

representation, and appeal, central to the concept of progressive
discipline and which are embodied in the Collective Bargaining
Agreement, were unequivocally unavailable and not applicable to
supervisory personnel.

(T. pp. 594-95.)

Significantly, Hansen

stated that he did not have authority to create new policy or to
bind Kennecott.

(T. p. 590.)

Although Sorenson also testified in detail concerning his
subjective understanding of Kennecott's practice of progressive
discipline, Sorenson's credibility was highly suspect.

The trial

court was confronted with evidence that Sorenson had testified in
great detail and at great length as to the content, hours, and
discussions held at a particular management training seminar.
(Sorenson depo. pp. 32-39; T. pp. 398-411.)

However, when

counsel's questions became pointed, Sorenson retreated and stated
25

that he had forgotten that he had not attended that particular
training session.
testimony

(T. p. 411.)

regarding

other

Both Sorenson's and Hansen's

matters

was

also

often

directly

contradicted by plaintiff's exhibits and by the testimony of
Stewart Smith, former smelter manager.
38; Ex. 127, 129.)

(Smith depo. pp. 19, 31,

Sorenson testified that the start-up of the

anode casting plant went "very, very well" and had been a great
success.

(T. pp. 81, 87-89.)

testified similarly.

On direct examination Hansen

This testimony was contradicted by two

memoranda singularly addressing anode plant operations during the
period in which the anode casting plant was supervised by Sorenson.
(Ex. 127, 129.)

These memoranda articulate numerous critical

problems with the anode plant operations and illustrate that many
of the failings of the anode plant had been ongoing for some time.
On cross examination Hansen admitted that at one time the problems
at the filter plant and Stewart Smith's dissatisfaction were of
sufficient magnitude, that Stewart Smith removed all of Hansen's
responsibility for the filter plant.

(T. p. 617.)

Although Sorenson made general denials that he had ever
been informed of his performance deficiencies, Sorenson's own
testimony contradicted the notion that all was rosy with his
performance.

(T. p. 185.)

Sorenson admitted that while at the

smelter he received a less than satisfactory performance review,
which review when challenged was reaffirmed by Stewart Smith.

He

also received direct criticism of his performance by both David
George, his direct supervisor, as well as Stewart Smith himself.
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While at the concentrator, Sorenson testified he recognized Rod
Davey's and Bill Strickland's disappointment and dissatisfaction
with

the

secondary

supervision.

crushing

(T. pp. 316-17.)

operations

under

Sorenson's

He acknowledged that he had

numerous discussions with Gary Jungenburg about the condition of
the plant, and

that

Chris Robison

told him

that Davey and

Strickland felt sufficiently strongly about the affairs at the
concentrator that some people could lose their jobs.

(T. p. 330.)

But yet, amazingly, Sorenson's testimony was that his performance
at the concentrator had not been criticized (T. p. 82.)

Sorenson

also gave conflicting explanations regarding his preparation of
Exhibit 17, a memorandum to Gary Jungenburg discussing cleanup in
the crusher area and dated December 6, 1988.

(T. p. 322-24.) This

memorandum was prepared at approximately the same time Davey and
Strickland expressed their dissatisfaction to Sorenson with his
performance.

(T. p. 322.)

When his testimony did not coincide

with the date on the memo his explanation was that he back-dated
it.

(T. pp. 322-24.)
Sorenson suggests that Jerry Hansen was his supervisor

for extended periods of time, and therefore should be familiar with
his performance level.

(Appellant's Brief pp. 13, 46.)

This

testimony was contradicted by Stewart Smith, who testified that
while Sorenson may have reported operationally to Jerry Hansen at
certain times, Sorenson worked under the daily and administrative
supervision of David George, technical group superintendent, during
most times critical to this lawsuit, the times during which
27

Sorenson's failing performance was directly at issue.
pp. 20-21.)

(Smith depo.

Sorenson reported directly to Hansen only during a

short period while the plant was idle and Jerry Hansen was acting
plant manager. Other than that brief period of time, Sorenson was
assigned to the technical department, while Hansen worked in the
maintenance or operations departments.

(See supra, note 2.)

Confronted by directly conflicting testimony, the trial
court was obliged to make credibility and weight assessments to
guide its ruling on Kennecott's Rule 41(b) motion. The trial court
had before it the testimony of the plaintiff, Kelly Sorenson. The
trial court also had the testimony of former employee, Jerry
Hansen, who had "expressed total disappointment in his removal"
from a senior management position and reassignment as an engineer.
(Smith depo. p. 27.)

Finally, the court had the testimony of

Stewart Smith, a former high level Kennecott official and smelter
plant manager.

Smith certainly had no motivation to color his

testimony in favor of Kennecott. Kennecott fired Smith without any
stated reason, after only three years at Kennecott.
p.

44.)

These

facts, coupled

with

the

(Smith depo.

inconsistencies

and

inaccuracies of Sorenson's and Hansen's testimony, prevent Sorenson
from meeting his burden before this Court of establishing that the
trial court abused its discretion in its weight and credibility
assessments of the witnesses who testified as to progressive
discipline.
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III. THE COURT OF APPEALS MAY ALTERNATIVELY AFFIRM THE
DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT ON THE GROUND THAT DEFENDANT
MET THE TERMS OF ANY IMPLIED-IN-FACT CONTRACT WITH
PLAINTIFF.
A.

If Plaintiff Proved Any Terms of an
Implied-in-fact Contract, He Showed
Only That He Was Entitled to Notice
of Unsatisfactory Performance.

Although defendant Kennecott did not present its case to
the trial court, having successfully brought a Rule 41(b) motion
for dismissal, there is adequate evidence in the record to affirm
the decision of the trial court on the alternative ground that
Sorenson received notice of his unsatisfactory performance prior to
his termination. The Court of Appeals may affirm the trial court's
decision on any reasonable ground, even if not relied upon by the
trial court. Kenyon v. Regan, 826 P.2d 140, 142 (Utah App. 1992).
"Thus, if an argument made for the first time on appeal will result
in affirmance, the argument will be considered" by the Court of
Appeals.

State v. Elder, 815 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah App. 1991).
Progressive discipline, as interpreted and practiced by

Kennecott, does not mean a lock-step disciplinary approach.

For

example, a worker need not receive a certain number of verbal
warnings prior to receiving a written warning, or a certain number
of written warnings prior to suspension or termination.
586.)

Jerry

Hansen

offered

extensive

testimony

Kennecott's practice of progressive discipline.

(T. p.

concerning

Hansen testified

that progressive discipline did not necessarily mean that one was
always entitled to a verbal warning.
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(T. pp. 586-87.)

Hansen

further stated that a written warning would not necessarily be
preceded by a verbal warning,

(T. pp. 586, 588.)

Hansen further

testified that progressive discipline might mean that discipline
was initiated at the time off stage, bypassing both written and
verbal warnings.

(T. p. 586.)

Finally, Hansen testified that

Kennecott's practice of progressive discipline would allow for the
discharge of a salaried employee who had received neither a verbal
warning, written warning or suspension prior to termination.

(T.

p. 586.) Hansen described a panoply of rights applicable to unionrepresented employees subjected to discipline. Hansen stated that
not one of those rights was applicable to salaried employees.

(T.

pp. 594-95.)
Kennecott

practiced

progressive

discipline

with

its

union-represented employees as a means of implementation of and
adherence to the Collective Bargaining Agreement.

In contrast,

progressive discipline was applied to salaried employees, not as a
matter of contract, but as a good management technique.

(Smith

depo. p. 46.) Jerry Hansen conceded that as a supervisor he viewed
the application of progressive discipline differently for salaried
and union-represented employees.

(T. p. 596.) This difference is

exhibited in Hansen's own experience of demotion without preceding
discipline, as well as the terminations of Tracy Johnson and
Stewart Smith.
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B.

Kennecott Provided Sorenson Adequate
Notice of Performance Deficiencies
Prior to Termination.

Sorenson's own testimony and trial exhibits demonstrate
that

he

had

a

significant

history

communications prior to termination.

of

counseling

and

other

In fact, Sorenson had been

previously demoted by two grades, and had been removed from his
position in the anode casting plant for inadequate performance,
(T. p. 369; Smith depo. p. 21.)

During the period preceding his

removal, Sorenson received verbal counseling from Stewart Smith,
plant manager, concerning his performance in the anode casting
plant.

(Smith depo. pp. 19, 31, 3 8.)

Moreover, Sorenson became

aware of management's dissatisfaction with his performance through
written memoranda from Stewart Smith to Jerry Hansen and David
George discussing operations at the anode plant, operations for
which Sorenson was directly responsible.

(Ex. 127, 129.)

Sorenson's immediate supervisor in the anode casting
plant, David George, criticized Sorenson's performance on several
occasions.

Sorenson testified that George criticized him when he

failed to report promptly after his troubleshooting trip to Chile.
(T. p. 92.)

Sorenson also received a G- performance rating for

19 87 while he was under the supervision of David George.
448.)
letter

(T. p.

At about that same time, George gave Sorenson a detailed
articulating

Sorenson's

deficiencies in the anode plant.

performance

problems

and

(Smith depo. p. 32.)

Sorenson began his final assignment at Kennecott with a
performance admonition.

When Stewart Smith called Sorenson into
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his office to hasten Sorenson's transfer, Smith told Sorenson that
the transfer was an opportunity for Sorenson to "redeem" himself
from past performance deficiencies and that this was his "last
chance."

(Smith depo. pp. 22, 28.)

Despite this unambiguous

declaration, Sorenson did not effect significant improvement at the
concentrator plant.

Sorenson testified that Rod Davey and Bill

Strickland communicated their disappointment in the condition of
the secondary crushing area to him during their plant tour in
December 1988.

(T. p. 307.)

Sorenson also testified that Gary

Jungenburg identified numerous problems in the concentrator plant
and told Sorenson what to do about them.

(T. pp. 319-20, 326.)

Sorenson's supervisor, Chris Robison, went so far as to tell
Sorenson that the plant condition was so poor that "some people
could lose their jobs."
In

sum,

(T. p. 330.)

even

though

Sorenson

had

no

contractual

entitlement to progressive discipline, he received the type of
communication

normally

made

to

regarding performance issues.

Kennecott

salaried

employees

Sorenson was on notice of his

deficient performance by virtue of extensive counseling and written
communications, including his formal annual performance evaluation
conducted by David George.

Accordingly, the Court of Appeals may

affirm the decision of the trial court on the grounds that, even if
Sorenson

did

benefit

from

an

implied-in-fact

contract

of

employment, Sorenson received the progressive discipline impliedly
required by that contract.
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CONCLUSION
The trial court properly dismissed Sorenson's amended
complaint under Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Sorenson did not prove an implied-in-fact contract for continued
employment; neither the superseded code of conduct, Kennecott's
practice of progressive discipline nor the management training
courses supported Sorenson's claim.

Alternatively, the Court of

Appeals may affirm the trial court's judgment on the grounds that
Sorenson received progressive discipline through the numerous
verbal and written warnings of his inadequate job performance. The
court also properly exercised its discretion under Rule 41(b) in
assessing weight and credibility of the trial witnesses.
Kennecott asks the Court to affirm the judgment and
decision of the trial court in all respects and to award its costs
on appeal as provided by Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 34.
DATED this Jvjday

of March, 1993.
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